

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.247  
10 March 1966  
ENGLISH

---

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 10 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

(Mexico)

OF MICHIGAN

JUN 7 1966

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

cdc.66-229

66-10721

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO  
Mr. G. de CARVALHO SILOS  
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV  
Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV  
Mr. D. POPOV  
Mr. D. KOSTOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. C. J. MARSHALL  
Mr. P. D. LEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK  
Mr. V. VAJNAR  
Mr. R. KLEIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ABERRA  
Mr. A. ZELLEKE

India:

Mr. V. C. TRIVEDI  
Mr. K. P. LUKOSE  
Mr. K. P. JAIN  
Mr. S. V. PURUSHOTTAM

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI  
Mr. S. AVETTA  
Mr. F. SORO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO  
Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. G. O. IJEWERE  
Mr. O. O. ADESOLA

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. A. SZOWRONSKI  
Mrs. H. SKOWRONSKA

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU  
Mr. N. ECOBESCU  
Mr. C. UNGUREANU  
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD  
Mr. E. BOMAN  
Mr. J. FRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN  
Mr. O. A. GRINEVSKY  
Mr. A. A. OZADOVSKY

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF  
Mr. A. OSMAN  
Mr. M. KASSEM  
Mr. A. A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Harold BEELEY  
Mr. J. G. TARCURDIN  
Miss E. J. M. RICHARDSON  
Mr. M. J. F. DUNCAN

United States of America:

Mr. A. S. FISHER  
Mr. C. H. TIMBERLAKE  
Mr. L. D. WEILER  
Mr. W. F. MILLER

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the two hundred and forty-seventh plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): The Bulgarian delegation has always ascribed due importance to the implementation of partial measures relating to disarmament: the limitation of armaments, the prohibition of the use of weapons of mass destruction, the prevention of world-wide military conflict -- measures aimed at improving the international atmosphere. As is well known, we stand for radical solutions in the field of disarmament -- for general and complete disarmament. But we are not maximalists; we have not put, nor do we put now, the question according to the maxim of "all or nothing". We are prepared to go towards the goal step by step.

Referring to the disarmament negotiations, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Mr. Todor Zhivkov, in the speech which he made in Parliament on 8 December 1965 and which I have already quoted (ENDC/PV.238, p.12), declared that the Government of my country deems it essential to carry out a number of partial measures likely to reduce tension in the world and, at the same time, the danger of war. Premier Zhivkov pointed out in particular the need to extend the Moscow Treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests in three environments (ENDC/100/Rev.1) to cover underground tests as well, and the need to establish denuclearized zones as an important measure that would limit the spread of nuclear weapons.

Since the signing of the Moscow Treaty there has elapsed a fairly long time, filled on the one hand with very great achievements in science and technology, and on the other with a deterioration of international relations. One of these phenomena -- technological progress -- facilitates a solution of the problem of the complete cessation of nuclear tests; while the other -- international tension -- makes that solution even more urgent. The Moscow Treaty itself did not at all imply the legalization of underground nuclear tests but, on the contrary, bound the parties to strive for the earliest possible prohibition of all nuclear tests. Over one hundred States adhered to the Treaty; this emphasized its importance as a first step towards total prohibition.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Why, then, have underground tests still not been stopped? The position of the socialist countries on this question is clear. They steadfastly stand for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests by extending the scope of the Moscow Treaty to cover them. Moreover, they base themselves on the fact that underground nuclear tests can be detected by existing national means of control. Practical experience in recent years has shown that not a single underground test has remained secret. Many scientists and seismologists, including those of the Western Powers, speak of the high degree of accuracy attained by seismic control technology. The obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests turns out not to be the imperfection of human knowledge in this field!

Other reasons are preventing us in this case, and they can be discerned without a microscope: they consist in the desire of the Western countries to prolong the situation of keeping "a free hand" which has enabled, for example, the United States to carry out quite a number of underground explosions since the Moscow Treaty. As is evident, the United States military authorities have an extensive programme of underground tests for which the two years and seven months that have elapsed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty have not sufficed. How many more months or years will be needed to fulfil the programme of underground nuclear tests in the United States? Both the Moscow Treaty and a special resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/2032 (XX); ENDC/161) as well as the whole international situation, await an answer to this question.

As has been emphasized by many delegations during discussion of the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the number of States which could produce nuclear weapons has increased considerably. One wonders what formal interdiction is preventing these States from producing nuclear weapons when there is still no non-proliferation treaty and underground tests are still not prohibited. None at all. Hence it is clear that the cessation of underground nuclear tests, besides putting an end to the improvement of nuclear weapons, will also be an important step towards their limitation.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

We are told that a certain, though insignificant, percentage of underground explosions of low yield require on-site inspection. But even if we believe this, even if we believe that the extension of the scope of the Moscow Treaty to cover underground tests involves a certain risk, we may still ask: is not a greater risk involved in the present position of freedom of action for everyone who wants nuclear weapons and can produce, acquire and test them?

It is therefore impossible to find any justification for the stubborn insistence on on-site inspection whereby the Western Powers are blocking a decision on the cessation of underground nuclear tests! At this point we wish to recall what ~~was~~ said by the delegation of Ethiopia, through its representative in the Committee, on 2 September 1965:

"The attempt to achieve a kind of perfection in detection and identification can constitute an endless game. What is needed today is the political decision and the ability to accept minor risks in the expectation of making gains in the wider field of disarmament." (ENDC/PV.229, p.16)

Indeed, there is still no political decision on the part of the Western States in support of the cessation of underground tests; but there is obviously a political decision to continue them. That is why the United States delegation is not in favour of the compromise proposal submitted by the United Arab Republic to our Committee on 17 August 1965 to the effect that the provisions of the Moscow Treaty be extended to underground tests above a seismic magnitude of 4.75 and that a moratorium be established for other tests pending a final solution of the question (ENDC/PV.224, pp.9, 10). We think that a joint appeal should be made to the United States to agree that the scope of the 1963 Moscow Treaty should be extended to cover underground tests and to put an end to disputes in so clear a matter.

Among the proposals regarding partial measures on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the problem of the elimination of military bases in foreign territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops from such territories has recently become particularly urgent. It has been established and proved by facts

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

that foreign military bases are not only unjustified in peacetime but are in most cases a source of unrest, to put it mildly, and also of conflicts that endanger peace. The Soviet Union set a good example long ago by liquidating all its military bases abroad, and it proposes that both this problem and the withdrawal of troops within their national borders should also be settled on an international scale.

The other socialist States have no military bases abroad. The majority of non-aligned States -- former colonies -- have got rid of the military bases of the metropolitan countries. The overwhelming majority of the Powers Members of the United Nations insist on the liquidation of military bases in foreign territories. Resolution 2105 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly requests the dismantling of all foreign bases in the territories of former colonies. Even some States which are members of Western military alliances are beginning to realize the harm caused by such bases.

Only two Great Powers represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee -- the United Kingdom and, in particular, the United States of America -- are stubbornly holding on to their military bases. But it is precisely the military bases of these two Powers that have been their main strongholds in previous conflicts and direct military actions since the Second World War, as they still are in those taking place today. Everyone is aware of the examples of military operations on the Indonesian islands and in the Arab South-East where the United Kingdom maintains its bases, and in the territory of Indo-China and in other places where the United States has established bases. Everyone is aware of the tragedy of the people of the Congo, of the people of the Dominican Republic and of many other peoples who are shedding their blood in the struggle against foreign intervention in their internal affairs, which relies on foreign military bases.

Posing as guardians of world order, the representatives of the West -- the owners of the military bases in foreign territories -- endeavour to prove that their bases are wanted and that they, the Western Powers, are benefactors who are taking the weak under their "protection" with the help of these military bases. Thus the situation in which this "protection" is being provided is more than strange: in most cases in the "protected" foreign territories there are no

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

other foreign armed forces apart from those of the "protectors"; that is to say, the "protection" in these cases does not relate to a danger from outside alleged to be threatening the protected, but to altogether different interests which are alien to the people of the country where the bases are established.

Against whom does the United States base at Guantanamo defend the people of Cuba, and does this people want this base to be retained? Against whom is the United States base at Okinawa guarding the Japanese people, and are not the Okinawa peasants waging a struggle for its liquidation? The displeasure of the peoples -- which we see at Okinawa, in Panama, in Indo-China and the Arabian peninsula, in all parts of the world and in all five continents -- this displeasure is understandable as they wish to be the unrestricted masters of their own land and to be free to decide their own destiny. The fable of "communist aggression", already laid bare when Hitler and Mussolini were preparing and stirring up the Second World War, is being shattered against the will of the peoples to live in freedom, to exploit their natural resources independently, and to have the social system which best meets their interests.

The false justification of the Western Powers' military bases established around the borders of the socialist States, which allegedly needed to be "contained", has also long since been refuted. No one doubts any more that the socialist States are peace-loving. At the same time the provocative nature of the encirclement of the borders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States by United States military bases stands out ever more clearly. Even many of the United States allies in military blocs are beginning to look at things soberly. They would not want to see themselves dragged into dangerous conflicts because they once short-sightedly and lightheartedly agreed to allow the establishment in their country of military bases belonging to their allies and to tolerate on their own soil the armed forces of their allies.

Thus there remains no justification for military bases in foreign territories. Moreover, the case of the accident to the B-52 bomber, as the Soviet delegation has rightly pointed out in detail, has thrown additional light



(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

on the danger of the existence of such bases. It is well known that nuclear weapons are kept at many United States bases. The B-52 bomber which crashed on 17 January took off from such a base. Now the Washington authorities have admitted precisely what the Soviet Government noted in its well-known aide-mémoire (ENDC/169 and Corr.1). It turns out that everything was as stated: the bomb was lost, the detonator exploded and radioactive contamination took place. Only one thing is lacking in the Washington admission: there is no mention of agreeing with the need to stop this infernal game, which delights only the manufacturers of the military material expended.

In Washington's official explanations what strikes one particularly is the justification of the original silence of the United States authorities on the ground that it was necessary for "security" reasons. One wonders: whose security? Obviously the "security" of United States military secrets, and not of the Spanish peasants for whom the danger has not passed even now, since it is not known how the still unfound bomb will behave. In many countries people are quite rightly wondering what would have happened if the Almeria catastrophe had occurred, not over tomatoes, but over some densely-populated area of Western Europe? No one would be so rash as to exclude such a possibility when it is well known that United States bombers carrying nuclear weapons are flying day and night, year in and year out, over foreign territories and the high seas.

These monstrous activities carried out in peacetime are bound to be of interest to the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and we again appeal for support for the proposal of the Soviet delegation to demand the cessation of United States nuclear "patrols" beyond the borders of the United States. The elimination of military bases in foreign territories would also help to eliminate dangerous flights of aircraft with mass death aboard; but these flights can and must be stopped immediately.

It is not an easy task, we may be told, to do away with military bases while the United States is waging a real war in Viet-Nam and relying precisely on its bases in South Viet-Nam, on the Japanese islands, in Taiwan, in Thailand and in

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

the Pacific Ocean. This certainly does not encourage us to expect early agreement by the United States. In this connexion I have to remark in passing that it is useless to remind us that it is not for the Eighteen-Nation Committee to settle the question of the United States war in Viet-Nam; we are well aware of that ourselves. However, in regard to what is preventing us from making progress we must not only not keep silence but we must speak out vigorously and strive to remove the obstacles.

The problem of eliminating military bases in foreign territories is certainly not an easy one so long as the agreement of those who established and are maintaining these bases is lacking. However, as soon as there is agreement on this, the problem will at once become easy. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must strive, both in accordance with the will of the majority of States Members of the United Nations and in the interests of peace, to bring about the speediest possible solution of the question so that the armed forces of all Powers would be stationed only in their own territories, where their total liquidation is also to take place in the future.

The idea of establishing denuclearized zones is becoming ever more popular. Already there exist proposals, on some of which United Nations resolutions have also been adopted, for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Africa (A/RES/2033 (XX); ENDC/162, Latin America (A/RES/1911 (XVIII); ENDC/117), the Balkans (ENDC/PV.168. n.15), and the Adriatic region. There is also the declaration of one of the great Powers, the USSR, of its readiness to respect the nuclear neutrality of such zones (ENDC/167, p.3). And how decisively important for peace would be the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the nerve centre of the globe -- central Europe! It needs no comment; everybody understands it.

In the Eighteen-Nation Committee much has been said about the mounting danger to peace in Europe if proper measures are not taken in good time. A number of problems on our agenda relate precisely to the situation which has come about in central Europe since the defeat of Hitlerism and fascism. It is natural to be interested in a region where half a century ago there existed the militaristic State of the Kaisers and quarter of a century ago the inhuman regime of Hitler, both of which were responsible for two world cataclysms.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It is natural to ask whether everything necessary has been done so that the same thing does not happen a third time, and whether the roots of the evil have been torn up, as was decided by the victors with the approval of all mankind. This is the crux of the matter: the militaristic past has been abolished only east of the Elbe, where the peace-loving State of the German Democratic Republic is flourishing and the creative genius of the German people manifests itself in creative labour and in ever-increasing international co-operation in the struggle for peace. In the other part of Germany, whose policies are so close to the hearts of some of the people present here, the General Staff, the cadres and the notorious German martinet spirit have been retained. So have the industrial concerns which once brought Hitler to power. That is, those factors have been retained which transformed Germany into an aggressive force and which today determine the revenge-seeking line of the foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany.

What else, if not revanchism, is signified by the claim of the Bonn authorities for the restoration of the 1937 frontiers? Does anyone refute this official claim of Bonn? Of course not. And, of course, it is clear to everyone that those who hanker after foreign lands have no illusions about the possibility of getting them in any way except by force. That is why, and not because of the Soviet missiles allegedly aimed at the Federal Republic of Germany, there is such an ardent desire on the part of the ruling circles of that State to get nuclear weapons into their hands or under their control.

Fortunately for the peoples of Europe and of the whole world, this is not 1939; above all, because a considerable part of the German people, organized in a democratic State, stands on guard for peace and, with its realistic peace-loving proposals, is contributing to the general efforts to bring about the elimination of tension and to block the road to war.

The Eighteen-Nation Committee has before it the proposals of the Polish People's Republic (ENDC/C.1/1; PV.189, p.6) and the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/151, 168) for a denuclearized zone in central Europe, for a freeze of nuclear weapons in that zone, for the removal of nuclear weapons from German soil,

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

and for the renunciation by the two German States of any type of such weapons. These proposals are as far as the sky from the earth from what the leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany are striving for. But it is precisely these proposals, aimed at safeguarding peace, that merit the attention of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Bulgarian delegation therefore believes that it would be right if the Eighteen-Nation Committee were to examine more concretely at the appropriate moment these proposals relating to the safeguarding of European security, which is of decisive importance for world security.

We do not intend to enumerate now in order of importance the questions which are under consideration by the Committee. However, success in solving any of them is to be desired, and we must all endeavour to bring it about. But the solution of one of these questions in particular would give rise to a sigh of relief in all parts of the world: the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. While the Committee is discussing how to destroy these weapons, so terrible for the human race, or how in the initial stages to reduce them to a minimum known as the "nuclear umbrella" or how to paralyse their means of delivery, we must in all earnest set about solving the question of prohibiting the use of these weapons.

Present and future generations will appreciate at its true worth the tremendous importance of the step taken by the Soviet Government in declaring that the USSR is prepared to assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons if the other nuclear States do likewise (ENDC/167, p.3). It is now up to the other nuclear Powers, especially as one of them has once already used such weapons. If some are inclined to argue about the unrealistic or utopian nature of the proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to argue about whether the right of anyone to be the first to use such weapons can be recognized, just as it is impossible to argue about the admissibility or inadmissibility of using such weapons at all. They have been condemned by mankind and must not be used. A formal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is our common duty.

The agenda of the Committee is filled with important proposals concerning partial measures. So far no decision has been taken on a single one of them.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

We must set about taking decisions; the international situation imperatively calls for this. The Committee has decided to assign a special place to the drafting of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to focus its attention at this time on that task. We consider this decision correct. Our first duty, in our opinion, is to work without respite until there emerges from the conference-room of the Committee a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in complete conformity with the will and interests of all peoples.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden): The Swedish delegation feels very much obliged to our two co-Chairmen for having provided us with an opportunity so relatively early in the proceedings of the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to concentrate our attention on certain so-called collateral measures of disarmament -- or, more adequately expressed, on measures to limit the arms race and reduce international tension. As one such measure, non-proliferation, is being dealt with in a separate series of meetings, we interpret the present work schedule as meaning that we should now focus on some of the others. First and foremost among those must be a comprehensive test ban, as we have a specific and pressing mandate to that effect in United Nations resolution 2032 (XX) (ENDC/161), significantly entitled "Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Tests."

There is no need to emphasize once more the imperative need for early agreement on a comprehensive test ban and on other collateral measures. Particularly against the background of those preludes to negotiations on non-proliferation which have been going on in our Committee during the last few weeks and where some divergencies of interest have persisted, it is crucial that we make headway on some measures where a greater harmony of interests prevails. This ought to be the case particularly in regard to a cessation of all nuclear tests, supported as it is by the United Nations resolution and by inclusion in the messages from the leaders of the three nuclear weapon Powers which were transmitted to us early in this session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/165, 166, 167). To our hopeful perennials belongs also the proposal (ENDC/120) to freeze the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes -- the "cut-off", to use our colloquialism. If we were to achieve an agreement on some of these items, it would not only be a

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

testimony to the united will of all States to turn away from the dangerous race in nuclear armament; it would also greatly help to achieve that "acceptable balance of mutual ... obligations" (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161) for which the non-nuclear weapon countries are clamouring.

Such collateral measures are, as we know, logically related intrinsically to the objective of "non-proliferation"; that is, to blocking the spread of nuclear weapons to a greater number of States. This is solemnly emphasized, at least in regard to a test ban, in United Nations resolution 2032 (XX) itself, which uses the phrase "Mindful of the crucial importance of a comprehensive test ban to the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" (ENDC/161). As we can safely assume, on the basis of statements made, that such a test-ban treaty, like the Moscow agreement (ENDC/100/Rev.1) would be signed by a great number of States, this would for all practical purposes eliminate the possibility of hitherto non-nuclear weapon countries creating and manufacturing nuclear weapons. It ought to be duly recognized that in signing the Moscow Treaty our country, as well as others often referred to as having a "potential nuclear weapon capability", has already sacrificed a considerable part of its independent nuclear weapon option. Politically it was possible, in a country like mine, to attain a very positive accord for signing that Treaty, because the measure agreed upon was internationally accepted and balanced. Not least it contributed, through a self-renunciatory gesture on the part of the nuclear weapon Powers, to a curtailment of certain risks inherent in their nuclear competition.

It could also be expected that an agreement to abstain, as from a certain date, from production of nuclear material for weapon purposes would be signed by a great number of countries. It would therefore have a similarly salutary effect on the political climate of the world. Besides, if agreed upon without too much delay, it would constitute a true non-proliferation measure, cutting off all aspirations to independent manufacture of nuclear weapons. An obligation to refrain from or to cease forthwith such production, devolving on nuclear and non-nuclear weapon countries alike, would thus fit perfectly into a systematic programme for a progressive nuclear freeze and disarmament such as our Brazilian colleague has outlined (ENDC/PV.244, pp.16 et seq.). It might well constitute the first article in a balanced non-proliferation treaty, where regulation of transfers between countries of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon material could then follow in a handsomely coherent sequence.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

But let me now leave aside the effects, albeit beneficial, on our vexed proliferation issue. These measures, and particularly the comprehensive test ban, would carry additional substantive values. Continued series of underground nuclear test explosions must be interpreted as increasing the risk of further perfectioning of the deadly weapons, undesirable per se but also because it jeopardizes the presently tenable balance of deterrence. Military experts are fully aware that, although some weapons development may reduce certain risks to humanity -- such as that of radioactive fall-out -- the major prospect is an increase in the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons and widening their area of application.

Recently warnings as to dangerous technological break-throughs have been heard more and more frequently. Not least are they centred on the possibility of producing such countervailing weapon systems that the precarious balance may be upset, favouring aggression. Among these are effective anti-ballistic missile systems -- ABM -- and all kinds of ingenious devices making it possible for missiles to penetrate another party's missile defence. So serious are considered the risks that such developments might disturb the relative balance and spur on a cumulative competition to ensure "over-deterrent" nuclear capabilities that prominent scientists have recently suggested that the super-Powers volunteer to carry out a three-year moratorium on these programmes. I can refer to the report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament to the White House Conference on International Co-operation, under the chairmanship of Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, published in Washington late in 1965.<sup>1/</sup>

There are arguments aplenty for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. The Swedish delegation is always anxious that our Committee should not by-pass any opportunity to move ahead. Even if for the time being the Committee has no more meetings at its disposal for substantive discussions on a comprehensive test ban treaty, my delegation wishes to present some comments and suggestions which might contribute to making a forthcoming round of negotiations concrete and constructive.

---

<sup>1/</sup> National Citizens' Commission: White House Conference on International Co-operation, 28 November - 1 December 1965. Report of the Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament: Document/21.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

My colleagues need not fear, however, that I shall make a long discourse on detection and identification and other technical subjects. These aspects of the problem of test ban verification have been given their full share in previous statements by the Swedish delegation both in this Committee and in the United Nations. It also now seems to be generally accepted that for purposes of detection and identification, even of underground tests --- that is, for recording seismic events and for attempting to separate those indicating man-made explosions from natural earth tremors --- we are going to use national observation posts and national interpretation of the data obtained. To ensure that national authorities have a maximized amount of relevant data available, an attempt at organizing informal and voluntary international co-operation is being made.

The purpose of the so-called "detection club" is precisely to help achieve a more rapid exchange of such data, particularly from the technologically most advanced stations, sensitized to the teleseismic signals from continents far apart. Certain preliminary talks on this matter are now proceeding between a small number of non-nuclear weapon countries. In the future, the circle of participants in these talks ought to widen, with contributions also from the nuclear weapon States, with their acknowledged high level of seismological capabilities.

Today I want to concentrate on another aspect, with a legal rather than a technical connotation. As matters have developed, it becomes essential for us to re-examine the scheme for verification of a comprehensive test ban outlined in the eight-nation memorandum of 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28), which is still, as far as I understand, the basic document.

The substitution of an informal exchange of detection data for the once contemplated international scientific commission that was to act as a kind of jury necessitates in itself rather fundamental changes. During the intervening years science has also improved the detection possibilities, so that the margin of uncertainty as to the nature of the source of a seismic event is considerably smaller and is continually being further reduced. Politically, also, the situation is incomparably more reassuring now than four years ago, as confidence in a treaty engagement being upheld has grown all over the world. This is without any doubt a result of the Moscow Treaty -- and we should all salute with satisfaction and pride that evidence of what advantageous effects an agreement in the disarmament field can entail.



(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

Consequently, we might now be able to envisage a fairly considerable attenuation of the whole process suggested in that memorandum, interposing some more opportunities for allaying suspicions of a breach of the agreement. My intention today is to discuss how far we can move ahead in order to secure adherence to the treaty, stopping short in my intervention just at that more and more distant point where the inspection issue might be resurrected -- if, indeed, anybody would still be interested in doing so in a new situation when we might have succeeded in agreeing on a firm sequence for removing many of the uncertainties.

Without any doubt the question of inspections, which was formerly so vexatious, seems in more recent statements relating to the subject of a test ban to have acquired a less central character. We have also "lost" in the course of developments in the intervening years the international commission which could have acted as a "jury", as I have just said. Responsibility for the interpretation of data and the identification of seismic events will be upon national institutions and authorities. Their verdict will, however, be fortified exactly to the extent that there is unanimity in the scientific world -- and the degree of such unanimity is easily established in our era of international communication. But now, as before, our endeavours must be to construe rules about right of withdrawal and about verification in such a way that they act as a deterrent both to any clandestine testing of nuclear weapons and to facile abrogation of the treaty.

The cardinal point remains that abrogation of the treaty is the only sanction available against a breach of the treaty. Thus the tenets of a viable treaty are that no party can be interested in making possible such abrogation on flimsy grounds. The unity of interest in keeping a treaty binding on all is and remains its strongest foundation. Legally, this interest in trammelling the right to cancel the agreement will probably be expressed by some clause similar to the one in the Moscow Treaty, and also employed in the draft treaties on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/152, 164), requiring for a party's right of renunciation that "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country" (ENDC/100/Rev.1, p.3). The crux of the matter is: what will constitute such an "extraordinary event" that it establishes the right for a party to withdraw from the treaty obligations?

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

The simplest case would seem to be if scientific data indicate that a party has conducted nuclear test explosions and that party affirms that this is the correct interpretation. No further qualifications are needed if the case is not disputed. The other parties to the treaty are sovereign in their judgment as to whether an "extraordinary event jeopardizing supreme interests" has occurred.

Complications appear if a case is disputed. But there is a great difference in degrees of suspicions. Let us first make a distinction between the different categories in which interpretation of the seismic data detected may fall. Some events will be interpreted as clearly due to earthquakes, and thus be written off by those concerned with the implementation of the test-ban Treaty, although affecting -- and sometimes deeply -- others concerned with the problems of earthquakes. But a residual category will remain which will not be so identified. In this category, however, we might distinguish between those which are simply "unclear events", unidentified as to their nature, and those which might be classified as "suspicious events" by the authorities in various countries responsible for such interpretations.

Let us try to imagine what the situation will be if rumours reverberate from this expert discussion that a party might have undertaken a test explosion. It seems to me that a primordial assumption should be that parties to the treaty would themselves be vitally interested in dispelling any doubts cast upon their principled adherence to the treaty. If scientific data made it highly probable that a nuclear test explosion had taken place -- something that in these times would be bound to be widely publicized -- then the standing of the suspected party in the international community would seem to make it imperative for him to vindicate his veracity if he claimed to be innocent. He would certainly hasten to offer explanations. If the accusations persisted, he might even take recourse to "inspection by invitation". This was foreseen in the joint memorandum of April 1962 -- although its references to "the commission" are now outdated. In that document we read:

"All parties to the treaty should accept the obligation to furnish the Commission with the facts necessary to establish the nature of any suspicious and significant event. Pursuant to this obligation the

(Mrs. Nyrdal, Sweden)

parties to the treaty could invite the Commission to visit their territories and/or the site of the event the nature of which was in doubt." (ENDC/28, p.2)

That such invitations should be expected was also underlined in the following statement made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, at our 71st meeting -- and I am sorry that I shall repeatedly go as far back as 1962, but that was the period when we thoroughly aired all problems concerning a comprehensive test ban:

"... the nuclear Power concerned would have to weigh up what other States would think and how world public opinion would react to the specific case -- whether the world at large would understand its refusal to invite the commission in that particular instance.

"As you see, all these are very serious matters for any nuclear Power.

"In the light of all these considerations, is it possible to come to the conclusion that the nuclear Powers will always refuse to invite the commission to visit their territory? Of course, it is impossible to come to such a conclusion; it would be quite unjustified. It is clear that any government will in each specific case approach the question with great care, taking all the circumstances into account.

"Therefore, it appears that the formula of on-site inspection by invitation, while not providing for such inspection on an obligatory basis, nevertheless does not preclude the possibility of on-site inspection in specific cases. This is truly a compromise formula."

(ENDC/PV.71, pp. 42, 43)

The memorandum of the non-aligned countries, generally speaking, as a matter of principle placed a greater burden of proof, onus probandi, on the accused or suspected party than is customary in the legal way of thinking. How wise this reliance on self-interest in exculpating oneself was, in comparison with a reliance on policing, has become more and more evident. The situation in regard to a test ban is rather extraordinary: it is technically so much easier to prove one's own innocence than to prove somebody else's guilt if there is a dispute as to the character of a "suspicious event" on the territory of a State.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

This has been clearly recognized from early on in the literature relating to test ban problems, where the value of obligatory inspections has often been doubted. I shall quote just one eminent United States expert, Dr. Robert Bowie, who dealt with this matter in the collective volume entitled "Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security" which was published in 1961<sup>1/</sup>. I quote from pages 51 and 52 of that work:

"One method for facilitating inspection at all stages is to require the participants to prove their compliance with specific obligations. They may be in a position to produce convincing evidence of their action much more easily than inspectors could establish the facts without assistance."

And the author went on:

"The suspected party would then have a real interest in establishing innocence. And it will frequently be far simpler for him to offer persuasive proof that he is not in violation than for the inspectorate to prove the real state of facts."

I hope my colleagues will allow me to designate the situation so far described -- in which the self-interest of all parties would be relied on to keep a treaty alive -- as the normal case, without risk of my earning the appellation of an "innocent abroad". On the contrary, I believe we could get agreement from all sides up to this point.

Matters obviously become much more complicated if clarifying evidence is not voluntarily brought forward by the party on whose territory an obviously "suspicious event" has occurred. A machinery for accusation will then probably be set in motion, in the first instance by one or several parties directing a demand for clarification to the party suspected of having carried out a clandestine test. A process of questioning and answering may then be expected to follow, and to result in restoring confidence. Something of this kind actually lies within our historical experience. I am referring to the Soviet underground nuclear explosion of 15 January 1965, which "vented", releasing radioactivity into the atmosphere, and became the object of an important exchange of notes between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

The designers of our forthcoming treaty text must, however, also deal with the possibility that such demands for clarification will not be heeded, or that the information offered will not be deemed to be satisfactory in the judgment of one or more parties to the treaty. To which procedure should these parties then have recourse? Just to stipulate their right to denounce the treaty does not seem to answer the requirement that withdrawal should be made difficult. Two considerations might help to forestall any rash decisions. First, there might be included in the withdrawal clause an obligation to notify not only all other parties three months in advance but also some international organ -- for instance the United Nations Security Council -- documenting the case for withdrawal by evidence that some "extraordinary event" had occurred. Secondly, the internationally-available opinion, basing itself on the published scientific material, could be counted upon to act as a corrective both on unwarranted accusations and on inconclusive denials.

Public discussion within the international community is an arbiter that can be expected to indicate which is more likely to be right: the party that voices suspicions that a violation has occurred, or the party that denies it. Both will presumably be very attentive to such judgments. But, of course, those cannot constitute any legally valid ground for justifying a notification of withdrawal. Such a decision must be taken on the political responsibility of the sovereign parties. But it ought to be self-evident that the possibility of abrogating the treaty would come to be exercised only when there was very strong circumstantial evidence that an event was truly "suspicious", while the great number of events which were just "unclear" would be left to pass, if they did not accumulate in a pattern that would again lead to strong suspicions.

This whole situation was succinctly presented by the Swedish permanent representative to the United Nations, who, when introducing the draft of resolution 2032 (XX) at the last session, said:

"We might well consider the fact that the ultimate sanction against a breach of an agreement of this kind is a retreat from the agreement by the party that considers its supreme national interest to be endangered. Indeed, if a State party to the treaty were to suspect an unidentified event to be an underground nuclear test, and if a request for clarification

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

and verification were rejected or answered in a manner which international scientific opinion found unsatisfactory, that might constitute a right for the party concerned to reconsider its further participation in the agreement." (A/C.1/PV.1385, p.6)

That is a concise rendering of the position held by the Swedish Government from the outset of our negotiations about a test ban -- a position that originated with a prominent authority on international law, our former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Undén.

Still, a further link in this sequence might have to be foreseen. Suppose a party to the treaty was deeply worried about what appeared to be strong indications that the treaty had been violated by another party, but was still hesitant to ask for its abrogation. Do we not have a common interest in making more rounds of procedure available? I am referring to the possibility that for purposes of verification some party might find it useful to challenge the suspected party to issue an invitation for inspection. If such a challenge, perhaps demanded by several parties, went unheeded -- and particularly if it went unheeded on several occasions -- the case for abrogating the treaty would seem to become particularly strong.

At this point I want to break my line of reasoning, because here we stand exactly at the cross-roads where the value of a still further step -- that is, of obligatory inspection -- must be weighed. Would such obligatory inspections really make the legal justification for withdrawing from the treaty so much stronger that the political encumbrance of the inspection issue would be balanced? This question must be referred to the main parties -- the nuclear weapon States -- which are the States actually concerned with testing.

This problem, however, also has a technical aspect on which greater clarification would be welcomed. The aim of inspection is supposed to be to bring forward not only answers in terms of probabilities of a test explosion having occurred -- that is what we get from outside indications -- but conclusive evidence: that is, concretely speaking, radioactive debris. Where does present-day technology stand in that respect? Has the verdict given by such an authority as Dr. Edward Teller now been rendered null and void? He has said, on page 127 of the publication from which I have just quoted: "Yet, these inspections, even if they were granted in sufficient numbers, would turn out to be difficult and possibly futile."

(Mrs. Myrdal, Sweden)

To judge from the much later report by the committee headed by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, which I mentioned a while ago, the doubts as to the efficacy of inspections have not been assuaged. We read the following on page 11 of that report:

"New improvements in national detection systems might make it possible to accept a treaty in which inspection followed a challenge based upon the threat of withdrawal; ultimately any quota of inspections is no more dependable than such an arrangement would be."

To this should be added another question, to which we have devoted attention on an earlier occasion and which was also broached by our Mexican colleague at the last meeting (ENDC/PV.246, p.8): whether inspections in loco should be international or "adversary", as the old term read. I am afraid that, without an element of international participation or checking of results, it might be difficult to get a consensus from all the many parties concerned as to whether a nuclear weapon test had been proven.

My statement today will end at this point, where the question-marks take over. The Swedish delegation does not want to pronounce itself further now on this matter of inspections. If agreement about them were reached, we might try to contribute some constructive formulae. But today I just wanted to probe how far our negotiations might move ahead towards a test ban treaty on this road of procedures described. It may be characterized as a system of "verification by challenge", to paraphrase a term recently used by Lord Chalfont (ENDC/PV.237, pp. 7,8). Admittedly it places considerable trust in what are usually called gentlemen's agreements.

The main weight of all my reasoning is that nuclear test explosions should be brought to a complete cessation. Their continuance does not increase but decreases the security of the world.

Mr. CERNIK (Czechoslovakia) (translation from Russian): In my statement today I should like to explain the view of the Czechoslovak delegation on certain aspects of the negotiations in our Committee on collateral measures. In this respect we are in favour of the recommendation of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.244, p.4) concerning the organization of our negotiations, which is to the effect that the Committee should give due attention to all the problems which have been entrusted to

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

us. This recommendation is derived entirely from the fact that it still remains the main task of the Committee to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament, to the consideration of which the subsequent meetings of our Committee will be devoted.

Of great importance in our negotiations, however, is the field of collateral measures, the implementation of which would lead to lessening of international tension, consolidation of confidence among States, a lessening of the danger of an outbreak of war, and the creation of more favourable conditions for achieving agreement on general and complete disarmament. The problems of collateral measures have come to the forefront, especially in the conditions of today when, as a result of the position of the Western Powers, the negotiations on general and complete disarmament are encountering serious obstacles and an early solution of these problems can hardly be expected. Moreover, the importance of certain collateral measures is emphasized at the present time by the urgent need to take definite steps to prevent a worsening of the situation and further complication which would make it much more difficult to solve the problems before the Committee.

In resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its twentieth session stress was laid on the urgent need for certain collateral measures, especially the preparation of a draft treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which should be void of any loop-holes for the direct or indirect proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form (A/RES/2028 (XX); ENDC/161). The Assembly also stressed the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests (A/RES/2032 (XX); *ibid.*). The importance and the necessity of solving these two problems has been made quite clear, both at the session of the General Assembly and in our present negotiations. We therefore consider it right that the Committee should give attention in priority to consideration of these problems and, in particular, to the adoption of effective measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons.

Besides these questions, it would be appropriate to discuss certain other proposals in the field of collateral measures. That is what the Czechoslovak



(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

delegation intends to do in its statement today. We must find measures which have the best prerequisites for a businesslike discussion and which in our opinion offer the best prospects for achieving agreement. Moreover, in our opinion, we should be guided by the following criteria:

1. First of all, we must concentrate our attention on measures the implementation of which is of interest to the widest range of States. This interest may, of course, be due to various factors. Among these, however, the decisive factor should be whether the particular measure can help effectively towards relaxing international tension, consolidating mutual confidence in relations between States, and lessening the danger of an outbreak of war, and also to what extent it will be likely to prevent a further deterioration of the international situation which would make most international problems, particularly that of disarmament, more difficult to solve.

We consider the most important factor to be the interest of the widest range of States in the implementation of the particular measure. That this point of view is correct is confirmed by the experience we have had so far, which shows that the discussion of measures whose implementation would accord with the interests of the largest number of States is that which offers the greatest prospect of achieving concrete results. We consider that this criterion is met both by measures of a universal nature affecting the interests of all States, and by certain measures which, although they relate to certain regional problems, could nevertheless by their nature have a favourable effect on the general development of the world situation.

2. It is to be assumed that the Committee, when discussing collateral measures, should concentrate its attention mainly on measures which offer the greatest prospects for the achievement of agreement and which if implemented would not give unilateral advantages to any States and would not prejudice the legitimate interests of other States, particularly in regard to ensuring their security.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

3. Lastly, there should be included measures the implementation of which does not involve complicated arrangements, particularly in the field of inspection.

Besides these criteria we could give several more. We consider, however, that measures which do not meet these three main requirements have at present no prospect of being adopted at an early date. On the other hand, measures which meet these criteria provide a suitable basis for businesslike discussion and for the achievement of concrete results -- provided, of course, that all the participants in the negotiations have sufficient good will and wish to reach agreement.

In our opinion these criteria are met to a large extent by certain measures which could lead to a lessening of the danger of a nuclear war. Hitherto the overwhelming majority of delegations have quite rightly stressed in the negotiations that our Committee should concentrate mainly on such measures as would lead to the elimination or at least a lessening of this danger. This was shown in the discussion both of the question of general and complete disarmament and of collateral measures. This demand is quite rightly put forward also at the present time. Particularly in connexion with the discussion of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, it has been quite rightly pointed out that the achievement of agreement on this question is not an end in itself but only a means, a step towards the goal, which is general and complete disarmament and, above all, nuclear disarmament. This view was clearly expressed in the non-aligned countries' memorandum of September last year on non-proliferation (ENDC/158), as well as in General Assembly resolution A/RES/2028 (XX).

The Czechoslovak delegation and the delegations of the other socialist States fully identify themselves with this point of view. We regard nuclear disarmament as one of the basic, most urgent and most important aims of the Committee in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. Its accomplishment would rid mankind of the danger of a nuclear war and would eliminate the material means for waging such a war. This should be one of the main purposes of our negotiations. Our experience so far indicates that it will not be easy to accomplish this purpose.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The accomplishment of any really effective radical steps towards nuclear disarmament meets with opposition from the Western Powers, who rely in their policy on nuclear weapons and are unwilling to renounce the possibility of waging a nuclear war.

However, such a situation in the question of nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament does not at all mean, in our opinion, that we have to put up with this state of affairs or that we must give up dissonsing measures which if implemented would lead to at least a lessening of the danger of a nuclear war breaking out. In the situation where, as a result of the position of the Western Powers, there is no possibility of completely eliminating the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war through the accomplishment of effective, radical nuclear disarmament within the framework of general and complete disarmament, considerable importance attaches to measures which would lessen the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war as a result either of premeditated actions by the governments of certain States, or of unforeseen events, accidents, technical faults, human errors, mechanical failures and so on.

In our negotiations so far there have been submitted several proposals in this regard which would bring us substantially closer to this goal. Among them an important place is occupied by measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, and by an agreement on the complete prohibition of all nuclear tests. That is why the Committee, in accordance with the appeal of the twentieth session of the General Assembly, is giving prior attention to their discussion, particularly to that of the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In efforts aimed at lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, the achievement of agreement on other measures in this field would also play an important part. For several years the agenda of our Committee has contained a proposal sponsored by Ethiopia and other Afro-Asian countries, to prohibit the use of nuclear

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

weapons. From the very beginning this proposal met with wide support, which was also fully reflected in the vote on the relevant resolution (A/RES/1653(XVI)) in the General Assembly.

The Czechoslovak delegation adopts a perfectly clear and consistent position on the question of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. We consider that this measure is in conformity with the interests of all peace-loving States. Its implementation would in no way affect the existing balance of forces to which the delegations of Western countries refer so often. Nor is the measure connected with any problems in regard to inspection which would complicate or hinder its implementation.

Nevertheless, despite all these facts the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons meets with stubborn opposition by the Western Powers. What else does this negative attitude show, if not that in their foreign policy they rely on nuclear weapons and are unwilling to renounce the possibility of waging a nuclear war? There is no doubt that, if the Western Powers were to change their negative attitude, this would help considerably towards improving the world situation and towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. It would also be an important step in this direction if the Western Powers were to show willingness to agree to the proposal put forward again by the Government of the USSR (ENDC/167, p.3), the nuclear Powers should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

An important place in the negotiations on disarmament and collateral measures is assigned to the problem of the liquidation of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries. Foreign military bases on the territories of other countries are a constant source of international tension, being springboards used for aggressive actions, for interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and for crushing national liberation movements. Events in Viet-Nam and in other States of South-East Asia, in many countries of Latin-America and Africa, and in other areas have confirmed this over and over again. The recent crash of the United States bomber in Spain has shown once again that the existence of bases and the activities connected with them are a constant potential source of the danger of a nuclear war breaking out as a result of a technical fault, an accident or some other unforeseen occurrence.

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

The Western Powers try to justify the existence of their bases by various arguments, among which the one that appears most frequently is the assertion about an alleged "threat" from the socialist countries, or the allegation that the proposal for the elimination of bases violates the right of States to individual and collective self-defence. Both these assertions are completely unconvincing. Today it is perfectly obvious to everyone, even in the West, that the assertion of an alleged "danger" from the socialist countries is absolutely unfounded and that such a "danger" exists only in the imagination of those who are trying with the aid of this danger to achieve their political aims.

Equally unconvincing is the other assertion that the elimination of bases would mean renunciation of the right of States to individual and collective self-defence. That right and the presence of foreign military bases can by no means be equated. For this reason also the elimination of these bases would in no case affect the right to individual or collective self-defence. However, it is well known that foreign bases and foreign armed forces are kept on the territories of many countries against the will of those countries and despite the strong protests of their governments and of public opinion. What, then, is the use of talking about the right of individual and collective self-defence?

Experience in the past and especially at the present time shows that the purpose of foreign bases is ever more openly directed towards the suppression of national liberation movements, towards preserving the remnants of colonialism, and towards interference in the internal affairs of States in order to defend corrupt regimes, imposed and maintained against the will of the people by means of foreign armed intervention. This function of foreign military bases is also shown by the fact that new bases have recently been created mainly in regions where national liberation movements are concentrated and where the struggle for the final overthrow of colonial rule and against new forms of colonial penetration is being intensified.

The Czechoslovak delegation considers the elimination of foreign military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of other countries an important measure which would substantially help towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and towards a relaxation of international tension. That is why we fully support the proposal that we should discuss and solve this problem as soon as possible.

Another useful step towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war would be the implementation of the proposal to establish denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. Of course, such measures would by their very nature be limited to

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

certain regions, but there is no doubt that their implementation would have a positive influence on the general world situation. That is why all States should support the proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones, even if such measures would be carried out in other parts of the world. The proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones are closely linked with, and to some extent complementary to, measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as measures for the prohibition of their use. In denuclearized zones the proliferation of nuclear weapons would in fact be completely excluded. The obligation which the nuclear Powers would assume to respect the status of the denuclearized zones could help towards bringing about the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

The Czechoslovak delegation fully supports the proposals to establish zones free of nuclear weapons. We appreciate these proposals as an effective step towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war in these zones. Naturally, we give the greatest attention to proposals for the establishment of denuclearized zones in Europe. In particular we urge the establishment of such a zone in Central Europe, in accordance with the proposal of the Government of the Polish Peoples' Republic (ENDC/C.1/1;PV.189,p.6) which would include, as is well known, the territory of the Czechoslovak Peoples' Republic.

The Soviet delegation recently submitted a new proposal the adoption of which would help towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. I am referring to the Soviet proposal that this Committee should issue an appeal for the immediate discontinuance of flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond the national borders of States (ENDC/PV.241, pp.8,9). The importance of this problem was confirmed quite obviously by the recent accident in Spain to the United States B-52 bomber carrying nuclear bombs. In his statement on 22 February the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Abera, was fully justified in saying:

"We are happy to hear that the safety fuses in the Spanish nuclear incident performed as they were intended to perform. But what would have happened if they had not done so?" (ENDC/PV.242, p.19)

That legitimate question should make every person with a sense of responsibility ponder on what measures should be taken to eliminate the danger of these safety devices failing to function in the event of a similar accident. It is not only the socialist countries that stress the seriousness of this danger and the need to eliminate it. In this connexion I should like to quote the following from an article recently published in the Spanish Catholic weekly Ecclesia, part of which was reproduced on 8 March of this year in the French newspaper Le Monde:

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

"This accident should bring home to us the gravity of the danger threatening the whole of mankind if every hour of the day and night the sky is filled with atom bombs which are merely awaiting a coded order to be dropped within a few seconds.. This means that the colossal devastation of a country is not a remote possibility, of interest only to theoreticians and authors of science fiction, but an ever-present menace ready to fall on our heads at any moment".

The Committee could help towards eliminating this danger by adopting the proposal to issue an appeal for the immediate cessation of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders, as has been suggested by the delegation of the USSR. In this connexion we ask the following question: If it was possible to reach agreement not to place nuclear weapons in orbit in outer space (A/RES/1884(XVIII); ENDC/117), what obstacle is there to the adoption of this appeal, which would be of considerably greater importance from the point of view of averting the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, lessening international tension, and consolidating mutual confidence among States?

Besides these measures, which deserve special attention since their implementation would contribute directly and indirectly towards lessening the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war, there have been submitted in the course of these negotiations various proposals relating to other important measures, such as the reduction of military budgets and the utilization of the resources released as a result of disarmament for the extension of economic assistance to developing countries, and so on. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has already stated its views on these proposals when they were being discussed both in this Committee and at the General Assembly. We still fully support all these proposals and are convinced that the implementation of any one of these measures would be an important step towards accomplishing the tasks entrusted to our Committee.

During the discussion of collateral measures other proposals relating to the field of nuclear armaments have also been submitted to the Committee. I refer to the proposal of the United States of America for the controlled cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the transfer to peaceful uses of a definite amount of such material obtained by the destruction of obsolescent nuclear weapons, and a controlled freeze of strategic nuclear delivery

(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

vehicles (ENDC/165). The delegations of the socialist countries had already adopted a clear position in regard to these proposals, and the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Tsarapkin, examined them again in his statement on 8 March (ENDC/PV.246, pp.28 et seq.). The Czechoslovak delegation considers that those who are concerned with the problems of disarmament, and in the first place the members of this Committee, will have no difficulty in replying to the question why these proposals cannot be an acceptable basis for serious negotiations.

In conclusion I should also like to mention a proposal (ENDC/77) to the implementation of which, for obvious reasons, we ascribe particular importance. I refer to the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression between the States parties to the Warsaw Pact and those of NATO. This measure concerns directly only a certain geographical region and a limited number of States. Nevertheless there is every justification for the view that its implementation would substantially help towards improving the international situation. The signing of a pact of non-aggression would lead, above all, to the stabilization of the situation in Europe, to the consolidation of mutual confidence, and to the creation of more favourable conditions for the development of mutual relations between European countries. This in itself would be of great importance. But at the same time the import of such a pact would reach far beyond the limits of the continent of Europe, because the two most important Powers of both alliances, the USSR and the United States of America, would also become parties to it. The signing of such a pact would have a favourable effect also on their mutual relations, and this in turn would be reflected in an improvement in the general world situation.

However, the Western Powers still refuse under various pretexts to set about a businesslike discussion of this proposal, although in the Moscow communiqué dated 25 July 1963, published at the end of the negotiations on the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, it is stated:

"The heads of the three delegations discussed the Soviet proposal relating to a pact of non-aggression between the participants in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the participants in the Warsaw Treaty. The three governments have agreed fully to inform their respective allies in the



(Mr. Cernik, Czechoslovakia)

two organizations concerning these talks and to consult with them about continuing discussions on this question with the purpose of achieving agreement satisfactory to all participants". (ENDC/101, p.2)

It is not difficult to imagine the conclusions which the socialist Governments must draw from such obstinate reluctance on the part of the Western Powers to agree to the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression, especially if we take into consideration that the arguments by which they try to justify their position are absolutely unconvincing. We consider that we can quite justifiably ask what are the true reasons for their attitude. What prevents them from accepting this measure, the substance of which is so simple and the importance of which for safeguarding peace in Europe and improving the general international situation is so great? It is obvious that the socialist States have to take this attitude into account also in assessing the approach of the Western Powers to other questions relating to the situation in Europe. Above all, they have to take it into account in assessing various measures and plans which are being carried out or are being considered within NATO, including plans for the indirect spread of nuclear weapons, the purpose of which is to give access to such weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany.

In conclusion I should like to stress that, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, it is high time for the Committee to achieve tangible results in its work. There is no doubt that the achievement of agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be of the greatest importance, and the Committee should direct its efforts to the accomplishment of this task in the first place. Nevertheless, agreement on certain other collateral measures would also have a positive effect on the world situation and bring about more favourable conditions for our further work. But if, this year again, the Committee's work proves to be fruitless, then we can for very good reasons expect that this will have serious consequences for the position and prestige of the Committee itself.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): The Polish delegation would first like to express its satisfaction at the resumption by the Committee of the discussion on collateral measures. We understand that the main purpose of the two meetings devoted to this question must be to review the position of the parties

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

so as to bring out the problems which might provide a starting-point for concrete negotiations. Consequently, without discussing in detail all the collateral measures submitted to the Committee for consideration, the Polish delegation would like briefly to explain its views on the measures which it considers should engage the Committee's special attention.

I think we all agree that the value of collateral measures lies mainly in their effect on the state of international relations. We also agreed that, thanks to the confidence it would promote, the adoption of various collateral measures might widen the field of international co-operation and help to solve a series of problems upon which general and complete disarmament depends. Lastly, we all recognize that collateral measures are valuable because it is relatively easy to put them into effect. This is particularly true of certain collateral measures of a legal kind.

The Polish delegation therefore supports the proposal to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. We have already had occasion to put forward our views on this subject during discussions here and at the General Assembly of the United Nations. We fully share the opinion expressed in the message from His Imperial Majesty Haile Selassie I to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, that prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would constitute "a great step forward in the attempt to reach an agreement on disarmament" (ENDC/171).

In the same line of thought the Polish delegation reaffirms its support for the proposal that the nuclear Powers should undertake not to be the first to use their nuclear weapons in case of armed conflict.

The collateral measures of a legal kind also include the proposal (ENDC/77) that the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and the signatories of the Warsaw Pact should sign a non-aggression pact between them. Such an instrument, by reaffirming the intention of the parties to renounce the use of force and their desire to settle all their disputes by peaceful means, might strengthen stability both in Europe and throughout the world. A restatement of the general principles contained in the United Nations Charter by States belonging to opposing military groups could, by increasing mutual trust, pave the way for reciprocal and fruitful co-operation and consolidate peace in an area of crucial importance for the security of the whole world.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The application of the proposals I have mentioned would not only strengthen the international legal structure but also represent a concrete development of the United Nations Charter and an important step towards a peaceful world ruled by law.

The Polish delegation supports all proposals conducive to the normalization of international relations and the elimination of all factors hindering the normal and peaceful development of relations between States. Our first task, I think, is to liquidate all relics of the colonial era as quickly as possible and do away with the various military bases which the colonial Powers still maintain in different parts of the world.

We also believe that the time is ripe for a reappraisal of the strategic concepts of the cold-war period and for a return to a state of affairs better suited to peace-time conditions. In our opinion, the maintenance of military bases on foreign territory is no longer justified by any security considerations whatsoever and can only engender mistrust and friction. Their existence is liable to cause regrettable incidents such as that which occurred in January, when a United States bomber carrying nuclear weapons met with an accident in the western Mediterranean. The Polish delegation feels that the Committee should seriously consider the question of eliminating foreign bases abroad. It should act as a matter of urgency on the proposal submitted by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/PV.241, pp.8, 9) and adopt a resolution prohibiting aircraft carrying nuclear weapons from flying over foreign territories and the high seas.

Amongst the collateral measures, special importance attaches to the proposals for creating denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. The idea of regional denuclearization has gained ground since 1957, when the Government of the People's Republic of Poland submitted its proposal for the denuclearization of Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). Plans for denuclearizing other areas have been submitted, and concrete steps have recently been taken towards creating denuclearized zones in Africa and Latin America. These efforts have met with support from the General Assembly of the United Nations, which in resolution 2028 (XX) recognized the right of States "to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories." (ENDC/161)

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

Although the aims pursued by States in concluding de-atomization treaties may vary from one region to another, their main objective is usually to prevent a given region from being dragged into the nuclear weapons race and to safeguard it from the threat of nuclear attack in the event of armed conflict. The creation of denuclearized zones in different parts of the world could therefore not fail to have a favourable effect on the general international situation and facilitate a solution of the various problems raised by nuclear disarmament.

The Polish delegation supports the efforts of countries which are already trying to give effect to the idea of denuclearization in their own regions, but would stress that it is not sufficient to denuclearize zones which are still free from nuclear weapons. What is needed is the denuclearization of those areas which have been transformed into huge arsenals of nuclear weapons in recent years. That is why I should like to remind the Committee once again of the scheme for de-nuclearizing Central Europe known as the Rapacki Plan, submitted to the Committee along with others in the Memorandum of 28 March 1962 (ENDC/C.1/1), and also of what is called the Gomulka Plan for freezing atomic weapons in Central Europe, submitted on 29 February 1964 (ENDC/PV.189, p.6).

Although the two plans I have just mentioned differ in scope, their basic objectives are the same: first, to halt the atomic weapons race in Central Europe; secondly, to lessen tension and increase mutual trust; and thirdly, to create security conditions in Central Europe which will enable other outstanding problems to be settled.

The substantial quantities of weapons of mass destruction now to be found in Central Europe aggravate the threat of nuclear war. Any increase in the quantity of these weapons or their delivery vehicles in this region, and any change in their status, can only enhance the danger of nuclear conflagration and encourage a world-wide arms race. We fully share the opinion of the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi, who said at our meeting on 27 January last "any undue disturbance of the present military balance, either in Central Europe or elsewhere, would have serious repercussions on the peace and stability of the whole world." (ENDC/PV.235, p.30)

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation feels that the present military -- I repeat, military -- situation in Central Europe represents the main source of tension in that continent. It hinders the development of normal relations between the States in that area, constitutes an obstacle to creating a system based on mutual co-operation and collective security, and militates against any serious attempt to solve political problems, which can obviously only be done within the framework of a system guaranteeing the security of all. Clearly the application of disarmament measures to this region, including those proposed by Poland, would go a long way toward achieving that aim.

We cannot subscribe to the opinion expressed at our meeting on 3 February last by the United Kingdom representative, Lord Chalfont, who in explaining his delegation's views on the various denuclearization proposals said:

"Elsewhere in the world -- for example, in Central Europe -- patterns of alliance or political alignment may make it difficult to seek security along those particular lines. This may, in fact, be one of the few areas in which arms control and disarmament cannot be considered in isolation from political solutions." (ENDC/PV.237, p.9)

This attitude seems to rule out the possibility of applying collateral measures in the European region. By tying the various disarmament measures to political solutions we run the risk of achieving nothing. It becomes impossible to apply collateral measures or to achieve progress in the search for peaceful solutions.

The Rapacki Plan on the denuclearization of Central Europe and the Gomulka Plan on freezing atomic arms in that area aroused great interest in European public opinion. This has only served to confirm our view that the two plans reflect the interests of Europe and that their adoption could help to increase the security of all. We are keeping them on the agenda for international discussion, and we desire to continue the conversations we have initiated with other Governments on this subject. We are ready to lend sympathetic attention to any proposal designed to strengthen the effectiveness of our own proposals and to facilitate their implementation.

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

The Polish delegation fully shares the anxiety of other delegations on the question of underground nuclear tests. We consider that the Moscow treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) should be extended to cover nuclear tests in all environments. Such a step could put a stop to the improvement of nuclear weapons, halt the arms race and strengthen our attempts to close every avenue leading to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Underground nuclear tests could be prohibited immediately, and the Soviet Union has often expressed the desire to do so. Nothing prevents agreement on this subject except the unjustified demands of the United States concerning the supervision and international inspection of suspicious seismic events.

Such are the general comments the Polish delegation wished to make at this stage of our discussion on collateral measures. We hope we shall have an opportunity of reverting to the problems raised at these last two meetings; we hope, in other words, that we are not going to close a debate which has scarcely begun.

Mr. CAVALLETTE (Italy) (translation from French): The Italian delegation has several times had occasion to express its point of view on collateral disarmament measures both at Geneva and in the United Nations. We regard such an approach to the problem as realistic and important. Negotiation on general and complete disarmament has unfortunately proved complex and difficult, and we are therefore convinced of the absolute necessity of concurrently working out partial disarmament agreements in order to achieve immediate progress and a rapid increase in mutual trust.

As regards the various proposals for collateral measures now before the Committee, the Italian delegation still believes that priority should be given to the steps which seem the most concrete and easy to implement -- those which entail an effective and immediate reduction in military effort, accompanied by budget cuts. That is why we favour measures to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and of certain armaments. We are also extremely interested in the proposals for the destruction of agreed "packages" of weapons. It goes without saying that my delegation, like many others, regards a general prohibition on nuclear tests as an essential goal of the utmost importance to our work.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

My delegation does not intend to examine these proposals in detail today or to engage in polemics on those about which we heard last Tuesday (ENDC/PV.246) and this morning, which are neither constructive nor acceptable. Although some statements by the Eastern delegations seem to call for an immediate reply, we have not time to give one today. My delegation would like instead to concentrate on a particular problem which we feel is related to collateral measures. We, and I am sure many other delegations, attach great importance to this question, which involves the establishment of a link now widely acknowledged as necessary between disarmament and the social progress of peoples.

In this connexion I should like to recall the words which the Secretary-General, U Thant, used last spring. He said that we must reach the point when the resources now wasted in conflict can be used to combat the evils that afflict humanity. The same idea was expressed by His Holiness the Pope in his Bombay appeal, and was repeated in his message to the United Nations General Assembly. As the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Fanfani, said to the United Nations on 25 May 1965, we must "establish a close link between disarmament and progress, showing the peoples of the world that by banishing fear we increase serenity and hope" (DC/PV.88, p.13-15).

My delegation stressed the need for such a link in the recent discussions in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The idea met with general support and was embodied in a resolution. The purpose of my statement today is therefore akin to that of resolution DC/225 adopted by the Commission on 15 June 1965, which, after recalling -

"... the principle that a substantial part of the resources that will be released through disarmament should be devoted to the economic and social development of the developing countries ...",  
recommends the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to -

"... keep in mind the principle of converting to programmes of economic and social development of the developing countries a substantial part of the resources gradually released by the reduction of military expenditures". (ENDC/149)

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

At the meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission on 26 April 1965 the Italian delegation said:

"... without waiting for general and complete disarmament, we could, as of now, set up the principle that the first savings achieved by the adoption of some collateral measures of disarmament be allotted to mutual aid in some form of fraternal collaboration amongst peoples". (DC/PV.73, para.131)

In view of the support given to this statement at the United Nations, I should now like to draw the Committee's attention to this practical proposal and invite it to consider the preparation of a number of clear and functional directives on the matter.

If adopted, several of the most concrete and realistic of the collateral measures would involve substantial cuts in military budgets, which could be wholly or partially devoted to the social goals of progress and human betterment of which I have just spoken. Several solutions are possible. Concurrently with an agreed measure, for example, a plan could be worked out for utilizing the savings which would ensue from that measure. Alternatively, it could simply be noted that certain savings would be achieved, the countries to benefit from them being recommended to earmark them for specific purposes. Other solutions could be envisaged, depending on the resources of certain countries and the needs of others and on their national constitutions and particular problems.

The essential point in our opinion is that it should be regarded as a legal duty, or at least as a very strict moral duty, that any initial collateral disarmament measures concurred should bring immediate relief to the needs of various countries on the basis of a pre-established system. There would thus be a close link between the cause of disarmament and a human goal of the utmost value --- the reduction in the present striking disparity between the immense resources swallowed up in the arms race and the unsatisfied needs, often elementary, of certain countries.

It is true that nations do not lightly embark on such an unproductive method of spending their wealth. We in the West do so with regret, solely for well-known reasons of security and world stability; but if, as we hope, these objections can



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

be overcome without risk to mutual security by applying certain partial disarmament measures, it would be only right and proper for the countries most in need of assistance to benefit from the advantage immediately.

There should be no special difficulty in calculating the savings to be derived from collateral measures. It is not, as has sometimes been suggested, a question of achieving disarmament by reducing military budgets, which in present circumstances are neither comparable nor open to verification, but of harnessing the financial resources released by effective and verifiable disarmament measures and devoting them to humanitarian ends.

I am fully aware that the mere imposition of this obligation will not make it any easier to work out collateral measures as if by magic, because the tangible difficulties will remain. The following considerations should however be borne in mind:

1. The practical formulation of directives by the United Nations would be of great political value in providing concrete evidence that countries which have embarked on the armaments race much against their will nevertheless harbour sincere and constructive intentions towards all and in particular towards the developing countries.
2. Thanks to the existence of a well-defined aim in the sphere of human co-operation, a favourable climate would be created for the adoption of collateral measures, on which negotiations could thus be pursued with fresh vigour.
3. The establishment of a concrete link between assistance to developing countries and the first disarmament measures might also have some influence on possible unilateral disarmament decisions.

It will be remembered that some time ago the international situation permitted of a promising development known as the policy of "mutual example", which we hope can be revived. If a close link were thus established between disarmament and mutual economic assistance, unilateral disarmament measures could have beneficial repercussions on co-operation with the less wealthy countries. Although everyone is aware that many nations, especially the Western countries and the United States of America, are already devoting large sums to developing the less advanced countries, a concrete decision to convert at least some military

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

effort into humanitarian effort without diminishing security, in conjunction with a practical system for doing so, would be a highly significant step.

One of the first examples of the application of this principle is the proposal explained to the last meeting of the Committee by the United States representative, Mr. Fisher, regarding the use "for the benefit of mankind" of 100,000 kg of fissionable material at present contained in bombs (ENDC/PV.246, pp. 33 et seq.). If the Soviet Union would only accept the United States proposal, a large amount of fissionable material would soon be available, subject to certain conditions, for the progress and economic development of all.

The United States representative, Mr. Fisher, asked what the other delegations thought about his proposal. My delegation finds it extremely interesting and promising and would like to see it developed further in the light of the remarks I have just made. The United States delegation has explained the procedure involved in removing the fissionable material from the bombs. I hope the programme envisaged in the United States proposal can be pursued and amplified to cover the manner and proportions in which benefit can be derived from putting the fissionable material to peaceful uses. I am sure that such a programme, which would undoubtedly interest many countries, would provide a valuable stimulus to acceptance of the United States proposal, and give the Soviet delegation cause for further reflection.

That is what my delegation briefly wished to say today in the discussion on collateral measures. In accordance with resolution DC/225, it wished to reaffirm a principle which, having been accepted by the United Nations, must now be elaborated and if possible put into practice by us.

I hope the Committee will not find my comments misplaced and will regard them as a fresh appeal for a rapid agreement on collateral measures, for which my delegation has now given another cogent reason.

Today we come to the end of the second of the two meetings we decided to devote to collateral measures; but, as the Polish representative has pointed out, the debate on this question is certainly not at an end. Although we shall all no doubt be glad of a period of reflection, the Committee must certainly resume its examination of these measures again in greater detail later in the session. I hope it will then keep in mind, to use the words of resolution DC/225, the remarks I have made today.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 247th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Antonio Gomez Robledo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Italy.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 March 1966, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

